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Hardy Companies, Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 49 (December 14, 2010) 1
BUSINESS LAW – Nevada’s Mechanic’s Lien Law
Summary
This case involves an appeal from a district court’s order expunging mechanics’ liens.
Disposition/Outcome
The district court erred in granting summary judgment against O’Neil and Hardy because prelien notice is unnecessary if SNMARK had actual knowledge of O’Neil or Hardy’s work.
Factual and Procedural History
Wickes Furniture Company (“Wickes”) leased property from ECT Holding, LLC (“ECT”), in
March 2007. The lease required Wickes to improve the property with build-out plans and a general
contractor approved by ECT. ECT approved Wickes use of O’Neil Industries Inc. (“O’Neil”) as its
general contractor. After the execution of the lease, pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT § 108.234 , ECT
recorded a notice of non-responsibility with the Clark County Recorder’s Office, but failed to deliver
notice to O’Neil and Wickes.
In April 2007, ECT transferred the shopping center by quitclaim deed and assigned all of its
rights under the lease to SNMARK. Mizrachi, manager of both companies, executed the document on
behalf of both entities. In July 2007, Wickes and O’Neil entered into a contract for $5,527,416 to
complete the tenant work and O’Neil subcontracted work to Hardy.
During construction, SNMARK, through Mizrachi, was involved in O’Neil’s construction.
Mizrachi directed O’Neil on several aspects of the construction, made fifteen to twenty site visits to
monitor O’Neil’s progress, and participated in meetings between Wickes and O’Neil. Additionally,
Mizrachi directed O’Neil to work on electrical panels for the entire shopping center and to work on
common areas that SNMARK was responsible to maintain.
O’Neil completed construction on Wickes’ store in November 2007. Between July and
September 2007 SNMARK paid O’Neil $2,150,001. Additionally, Wickes paid O’Neil $1,145,064 in
October 2007. 2 On January 18, 2008, O’Neil recorded a mechanic’s lien against the property for
$2,133,620 and listed SNMARK as the owner. However, O’Neil never gave notice of right to lien
pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.245. Hardy also failed to give SNMARK a notice of right to lien
pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT. 108.245. Hardy gave notice of right to lien to Wickes and O’Neil and
then recorded a mechanic’s lien on December 18, 2007, listing Wickes as the owner.
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By Tim Mott.
On February 3, 2008, Wickes filed for bankruptcy and vacated the property.

On January 25, 2008, Hardy filed an action against SNMARK, Wickes, and O’Neil. Then, a
month later Hardy filed to foreclose the mechanic’s lien. O’Neil asserted cross-claims against
SNMARK to foreclose its mechanic’s lien and also filed an action against SNMARK on April 1,
2008. 3
SNMARK motioned to expunge the mechanics’ liens and lis pendens, as well as for partial
summary judgment. The district court granted SNMARK’s motion in all respects because SNMARK
was not served with any Notice of Right to Lien as required by NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.245. This
appeal followed.
Discussion
Standard of Review
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas established that statutory interpretation is a question of
law that receives de novo review. 4 Second, the court established that summary judgment orders
receive de novo review. 5 Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 6

Finally, the Court established that NRS § 108.2453(1) 7 is ambiguous because it may correctly
be interpreted multiple ways. SNMARK argued that the NEV. REV. STAT. 108.2453(1) requires strict
compliance with the technical obligations of the statute. However, contrary to SNMARK’s assertion,
the Court stated that the statute could be interpreted as voiding conditions, stipulations, or provisions
of a contract that require a lien claimant to waive lien rights. The Court then stated that they must look
to legislative history to harmonize NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.2453 and NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.245.
Nevada’s Mechanic’s Lien Law
The Court proceeded by explaining Nevada’s mechanic’s lien law. The law requires that a lien
claimant serve the owner of the property with preliminary notice of right to lien (pre-lien notice). 8
Notice is required to provide the owner with knowledge that work is being incorporated into the
3

The district court consolidated both of these cases.
A.F. Constr. Co. v. Virgin River Casino, 118 Nev. 699, 703, 5 P.3d 887, 890 (2002).
5
Yeager v. Harrah’s Club, Inc., 111 Nev. 830, 833, 897 P.2d 1093, 1094 (1995).
6
NEV. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
7
NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.2453(1) states: “Except as otherwise provided in NEV. REV. STAT. 108.221 to 108.246, inclusive, a
person may not waive or modify a right, obligation or liability set forth in the provision of NEV. REV. STAT. 108.221 to
108.246, inclusive.”8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.245. Wickes is an owner because an owner includes anyone possessing less
than a fee simple estate.
8
NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.245. Wickes is an owner because an owner includes anyone possessing less than a fee simple
estate.
4

property. The mechanic’s lien statute is remedial and construed liberally. 9 “[S]ubstantial compliance
with the statutory requirements is sufficient to perfect the lien if the property owner is not
prejudiced.” 10
NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.245’s pre-lien requirement is satisfied when the property owner has
actual knowledge of the potential lien claim and is not prejudiced. 11 Failure to fully or substantially
comply will render the mechanic’s lien invalid. 12 The Court followed this explanation by addressing
SNMAR’s argument that the Legislature’s amendments in 2003 13 abrogated the substantial compliance
doctrine and now requires strict compliance in order for a lien claimant to perfect its claim. The Court
presumes that the legislature does not intend to overturn a law unless expressly stated or necessitated
by the reading of the statute. 14 The legislative history behind NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.2453
demonstrated that the 2003 amendment was to facilitate payments to lien claimants, not to overrule
Nevada case law that allows substantial performance to perfect a lien. In 2005, the Legislature
amended Nevada’s mechanic’s lien laws 15 and again did not overrule Nevada’s substantial
performance doctrine.
The court then concluded that NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.2453(1) did not overrule Fondren and
Durable Developers. NEV. REV. STAT. 108.2453(1) “voids conditions, stipulations, or provisions in a
contract that require a lien claimant to waive lien rights.” 16 The rule “that actual knowledge on the part
of the property owner constitutes substantial compliance, remains good law.” 17
Rules Articulated from Fondren
After establishing that Fondren is still good law, the Court proceeded by explaining Fondren
and the rules that it established. A property owner that negotiates a lease knowing that substantial
improvements need to be made has actual knowledge of potential lien claims on the property. 18
Additionally, if the property owner or his agent regularly inspects the project, the property owner will
have actual knowledge. 19 The Court ultimately concluded “that actual knowledge requires that the
owner has to have been reasonably made aware of the identity of the third party seeking to record and
enforce a lien. 20
Summary Judgment Against O’Neil

9

Las Vegas Plywood . D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380, 649 P.2d 1367, 1368, (1982).
Id.
11
Bd. of Trustees v. Durable Developers, 102 Nev. 401, 410, 724 P.2d 736, 743 (1986).
12
Schofield v. Copeland Lumber, 101 Nev. 83, 86, 692 P.2d 519, 521 (1985).
13
NEV. REV. STAT. 108.2453 was adopted in 2003.
14
73 Am. Jur. 2d. Statutes § 97 (2001).
15
See 2005 Nev. Stat. 427, § 25, at 1913-14.
16
Hardy Co., Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev., Adv. Op. No. 49 at 15.
17
Id.
18
Fondren v. K/L Complex, Ltd., 106 Nev. 705, 709, 800 P.2d 719, 721 (1990).
19
Id.
20
Hardy, 126 Nev., Adv. Op. No. 49 at 16.
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The Court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether SNMARK
had actual knowledge of O’Neil’s potential lien claims and therefore the district court erred in granting
summary judgment. There was a genuine issue of material fact because O’Neil claimed that
SNMARK knew the property required substantial remodeling when SNMARK negotiated the lease
with Wickes. Moreover, O’Neil claimed SNMARK had actual knowledge because of their constant
monitoring at the work site. Thus, the district court erred in granting summary judgment.
Summary Judgment Against Hardy
The Court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against Hardy
because an issue of material fact existed as to whether SNMARK had actual knowledge of Hardy’s
potential lien claim. However, the Court first dismissed several of Hardy’s arguments. First, service
to one owner does not give notice to other owners of the potential claim. Second, notice must be given
to the right person or entity and failure to provide such notice cannot be cured by NEV. REV. STAT. §
108.229(3). Finally, actual knowledge does not occur when the property owner merely has knowledge
of construction occurring on its property. Actual knowledge requires the owner to know the identity of
the third person with whom he has no contact. There must be some means to make the owner aware
that the third-party claimant was involved with work performed on the property. Further, courts will
not impute knowledge when there is no evidence showing the lessee or lessor knew the existence and
identity of additional third parties.
Although the Court disagreed with many of Hardy’s arguments, the Court concluded that issues
of material fact existed as to whether SNMARK had actual knowledge of Hardy’s potential lien claim.
Conclusion
NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.2453 does not abrogate Nevada’s substantial compliance doctrine.
However, notice must be given to the party whose interest the lien claimant is seeking to affect.
Additionally, notice to one owner is not sufficient to affect the interest of other owners. Finally, actual
knowledge requires the owner to actually know the identity of the lien claimant. The district court’s
grant of summary judgment against O’Neil and Hardy was reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.

